The Hunter Jones Group Exposed—From UK Loan Note Mis-Selling to Dubai Property Scams
An Investigative Report on the Transatlantic Fraud Network That Has Cost Investors Millions
I. INTRODUCTION: A Name That Spells Financial Ruin
The name Hunter Jones has become synonymous with investor devastation across three continents. In the United Kingdom, it operated as an unregulated investment introducer, funnelling ordinary savers into high-risk property loan notes that collapsed. In Dubai, it expanded into off-plan property schemes, promising luxury returns while delivering nothing but broken promises. And in the United States, Robert Hunter Jones—a Colorado-based financial advisor operating under the same name—has been accused of defrauding American investors through unsuitable Delaware Statutory Trust recommendations.
The Hindenburg Papers investigation has uncovered a sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional fraud network that has cost investors millions of pounds and dollars—a network built on polished branding, professional websites, and sales scripts that mimicked regulated firms, all designed to create an illusion of legitimacy.
The evidence is damning. The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) has repeatedly found against Hunter Jones, ordering compensation for mis-sold investments. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued an official warning about the firm. And now, victims across the globe are coming forward to share their stories of financial ruin.
This investigation reveals the full scope of the Hunter Jones fraud—from UK loan note mis-selling to Dubai property scams—and exposes the pattern of deception that has destroyed lives.
II. JACK RUSSELL’S WARNING: “Deliberately Structured to Appear Credible”
On social media, one voice has emerged as a relentless truth-teller about the Hunter Jones operation. Jack Russell, a commentator who has followed the firm’s activities closely, has issued repeated warnings to potential investors. His posts—dating from early 2026—provide a masterclass in how the Hunter Jones Group operated.
The Dubai Warning
In one post, Russell specifically warned about Hunter Jones Group’s expansion into Dubai:
“Hunter Jones Group – high risk investing in Dubai. There’s a history of an upheld complaint by the Financial Ombudsman Service involving Hunter Jones Group – an investor lost £20,000 but the FOS ruled that this sum should be returned in full.”
Russell then provided a detailed case study:
“Hunter Jones (HJ) marketed ‘safe’ property loan notes and special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) to UK investors. They acted as an Appointed Representative (AR) of Equity for Growth (EforG), which meant they were supposed to follow FCA rules.”
The Mr C Case
Russell detailed the case of Mr C, an investor who lost £20,000:
“An investor (Mr C) put ~£20,000 into Magna Group loan notes arranged by Hunter Jones Group. He was told they were secure, high-yield, and suitable for him. When the investment went wrong, he complained.”
What the Ombudsman Found:
- “HJ claimed to be ‘just an introducer’ — but in reality, they were arranging the deal (a regulated activity).”
- “The promotions were misleading: risk and liquidity were downplayed.”
- “The ‘sophisticated investor’ label was used, but the firm hadn’t checked if Mr C really qualified.”
- “Because HJ was an AR, their Principal (EforG) was responsible for their actions.”
The Decision:
“The Financial Ombudsman Service ruled in Mr C’s favour. He should never have been placed in the loan notes, and he was entitled to compensation.”
The Playbook Exposed
Russell then connected the dots to current schemes:
“Why it Matters Today: This is almost the same playbook we see in Hochi LLC emails:
- Glossy promises of high returns
- Loan notes, preference shares, or overseas property schemes
- Heavy use of ‘sophisticated investor only’ disclaimers
- Introducers/consultants pushing products they aren’t authorised to sell”
His conclusion was stark:
“If you see Hunter Jones Group in a Hochi-style pitch: assume that it is extremely high risk, that it’s unregulated, and potentially mis-sold. The disclaimers in the small-print won’t protect you. ‼️ Avoid ⛔️ Walk away ⚠️ Don’t do it.”
The Structure of Deception
In another post, Russell laid out exactly how Hunter Jones was “deliberately structured to appear credible and successful” :
- “Polished branding and professional websites”
- “Offices, staff, and sales scripts that mimicked regulated firms”
- “High volumes of investors introduced into property loan note schemes”
- “Confident language around ‘secured’, ‘asset-backed’, or ‘low-risk’ returns”
Russell emphasised:
“None of that equates to legitimacy. The FOS has consistently made the point that appearance of professionalism is not a defence where the underlying conduct is misleading or unfair.”
He further explained the legal reality:
“Hunter Jones was not authorised by the FCA to:
- Advise on investments
- Arrange regulated investments
- Market investments as suitable or safe
Instead, it operated as an unregulated introducer, funnelling retail investors into unregulated loan note structures, most notably via entities such as MIXG Ltd.”
The Crucial Distinction
Russell made a critical point about the difference between a “scam” and “mis-selling”:
“Scam vs Mis-Selling: A Crucial Distinction. I was correct to call Hunter Jones a ‘scam’ in the consumer harm sense, even if legally the label is often mis-selling of unregulated investments rather than outright fraud.
In practice:
- Investors lost life-changing sums
- Risk was systematically downplayed
- Returns were overstated or implied
- Exit liquidity was misrepresented
The outcomes for victims are the same.”
The Bottom Line
Russell concluded:
“My original description is accurate. Some of the reactions are understandable but incorrect. The FOS record is firmly against Hunter Jones’ conduct. ‘Looking successful’ is irrelevant to mis-selling liability. My advice is on solid ground – legally, regulatorily, and factually.”
III. THE FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE DETERMINATIONS: A Pattern of Mis-Selling
The Financial Ombudsman Service has issued multiple determinations against Hunter Jones and its principal, Equity for Growth (Securities) Limited (EforG). These decisions provide a detailed picture of how the fraud operated.
The Mr C Case (DRN-4686776)
The FOS determination in the case of Mr C provides a comprehensive account of Hunter Jones’s misconduct.
The Investment:
In May 2019, Mr C invested £20,000 into MIXG Ltd loan notes. The loan notes were issued by an investment company incorporated within the Magna Group as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that was to invest funds into various property projects.
The Introduction:
Mr C first heard about the investment opportunity through Hunter Jones (HJ) , who were an appointed representative (AR) of EforG.
The Collapse:
In January 2021, Mr C and the other loan note holders were informed that the Magna Group had run into problems. In its role as security trustee for the loan notes, EforG sent correspondence to investors telling them Magna had no apparent assets that could be acquired in order to repay investors.
The FOS Findings:
The Ombudsman found that:
- There was evidence that HJ was carrying out a regulated activity — that being arranging deals in investments
- The Ombudsman did not accept EforG’s view that HJ merely acted as an introducer, but rather it made a direct offer financial promotion, and this was ancillary to the arranging of Mr C’s investment
- The activities carried on by HJ were ones for which EforG accepted responsibility as part of the AR agreement
- EforG failed to meet its regulatory obligations and this led to Mr C taking out an investment he wouldn’t have otherwise
The FOS ordered EforG to pay Mr C compensation.
The Mrs S Case (DRN-4838876)
The FOS also ruled in favour of Mrs S, who had invested £40,000 in two separate Magna Group loan notes.
The Investments:
The Introduction:
Mrs S first heard about the investment opportunity through Hunter Jones, who were an appointed representative of EforG.
The Findings:
The Ombudsman found that HJ was carrying out a regulated activity—arranging deals in investments—and that EforG failed to meet its regulatory obligations, leading Mrs S to take out investments she wouldn’t have otherwise.
The Legal Reasoning
The FOS determination in the Mr C case included detailed legal reasoning that has implications for all Hunter Jones victims.
The Ombudsman found that HJ’s interaction with Mr C amounted to arrangements under Article 25(1) of the RAO as HJ’s involvement had the direct effect of bringing about the investment in the loan note.
Crucially, the FOS examined the appointed representative agreement between EforG and HJ. The agreement stated:
“The appointer [EforG] appoints the company [HJ] as its Appointed Representative pursuant to section 39 of the Act to carry out the UK Business… the activity which [HJ] is permitted to carry out pursuant to this Agreement is limited to arranging (bringing about) deals in investments and making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments”
This indicated that EforG did authorise HJ through the AR agreement to arrange deals at the time Mr C invested.
The FOS also noted that email correspondence between HJ and Mr C contained a footer confirming HJ was an “Appointed Representative (FRN808287) of Equity for Growth (Securities) Limited (475953) which is Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority” . This further demonstrated that at the relevant time HJ was acting in the capacity of an appointed representative.
IV. THE MAGNA GROUP COLLAPSE: £20 Million in Mis-Sold Mini-Bonds
The Magna Group—the issuer of the loan notes promoted by Hunter Jones—was at the centre of one of the UK’s largest mini-bond scandals.
The Scale of the Fraud
Between 2014 and 2019, £20 million of mini-bonds (‘loan notes’) were mis-sold to customers. The Magna Group was made up of seven companies, registered at an address in London.
Misleading marketing tactics and false information about the company’s financial health were blamed. The marketing material promised annual returns of at least 12% and downplayed the investment’s level of risk.
The Insolvency
The Insolvency Service investigation into the Magna group of companies discovered that marketing of the mini bonds was misleading, with marketing material overstating both the levels of security being offered and the true protections offered to them from the appointment of a ‘Security Trustee’.
In August 2021, the High Court wound up the seven Magna Group companies.
The Final Months
MIX3 and MIXG took over £2 million in deposits from loan note creditors between 1 December 2019 and 25 February 2020—a period when the directors ought to have known that all of the companies were insolvent.
The FCA banned the mass marketing of mini-bonds to retail customers on 1st January 2020. They were deemed only suitable for high-net-worth and sophisticated investors—not everyday people.
V. THE VICTIMS’ VOICES: Real People, Real Losses
The social media thread that first alerted the Hindenburg Papers to the Hunter Jones pattern is filled with the voices of victims.
Eric Carey: A Recent Victim
“Yes i have recently invested with them.”
Eric Carey’s brief admission speaks volumes. Like countless others, he was drawn in by the polished facade.
Ian Hart: “Complete and Utter Criminals”
“Complete and utter criminals. Do not go near them.”
Ian Hart did not mince words. His stark warning reflects the experience of someone who has been burned badly.
John Cole: Seeking Answers
“Ian Hart do explain have lost funds if so in what”
John Cole represents the countless investors trying to piece together what happened to their money.
Fouad Dehlawi: A Victim of Magna
“There are tens of investors who lost to magna, I am one of them. One of directors fled to UAE and enjoying high life there (yachts, private jets,..etc). The other director is now with another company to lure investors into high value real estates!”
Fouad Dehlawi’s comment reveals the human cost: tens of investors lost money, and the perpetrators fled to Dubai to enjoy their ill-gotten gains.
Alan Knight: A Near-Miss
“I’ve seen hunter jones for some years and projects have been paid back and i was thinking of investing with them. So they aren’t intending to run this as a scam, but the way and method of getting funds from the general public is the questionable thing? It does make you think why they don’t go to the banks to get the money for the property projects.”
Alan Knight’s comment is telling. He was on the verge of investing but asked the critical question: why don’t they go to the banks? The answer, of course, is that banks wouldn’t lend to them because the projects were too risky.
Cathi Hargaden: A Warning About Dubai
“with my experiences of Dubai I would say never buy real estate there and absolutely DO NO INVESTMENTS”
Cathi Hargaden’s warning is clear: Dubai real estate is a minefield for investors.
VI. THE DUBAI CONNECTION: Expanding the Fraud Network
The Hunter Jones Group expanded into the Dubai market in 2023, opening its first Dubai office. The company’s website promotes “a truly global perspective on real estate investment” with an office in the heart of Dubai staffed by a team of experts.
The Dubai Pitch
Hunter Jones Group Dubai offers “off-market rates and high returns” and promises “dedicated consultants and a concierge service” for every step of the investment process.
The company claims to have relationships with “the top 30 developers in Dubai” and says it is “often the first to know about new projects” .
The Reality
But the reality is very different. As Jack Russell warned, the Dubai operation is part of the same playbook: glossy promises of high returns, overseas property schemes, and introducers pushing products they aren’t authorised to sell.
Fouad Dehlawi’s comment that one of the Magna directors “fled to UAE and enjoying high life there (yachts, private jets,..etc)” is a chilling reminder that Dubai has become a haven for financial fraudsters.
VII. THE FCA WARNING: Official Recognition of the Threat
On 12 November 2025, the Financial Conduct Authority issued an official warning about Osborne Baldwin Limited, Hunter Jones Group, and HJ Collection, stating that these firms “may be providing or promoting financial services without FCA authorisation” and advising investors to avoid dealing with them.
The Warning’s Removal
The FCA warning has since been removed from their public warning list. However, as Refundee—a claims management company—notes, “the removal of a warning from the FCA list does not necessarily mean the underlying investor concerns have been resolved” .
The Complaints
Investors of HJ Collection and Hunter Jones Group have raised significant complaints surrounding their investments. Reported concerns include missed scheduled payments, unreturned property deposits, and difficulty making contact with the companies.
Trustpilot Reviews
Some investors have left complaints in their Trustpilot reviews. Despite the complaints, Hunter Jones Group maintains a 4.5 / 5 rating on Trustpilot—a reminder that online reviews can be manipulated and should not be taken at face value.
VIII. THE STRUCTURE OF DECEPTION: How Hunter Jones Operated
The Appointed Representative Model
Hunter Jones operated as an appointed representative (AR) of Equity for Growth (Securities) Limited (EforG) . This arrangement allowed Hunter Jones to operate under the regulatory umbrella of EforG while engaging in activities that, on their own, would have required direct FCA authorisation.
EforG’s appointed representatives included Osborne Baldwin Ltd, trading as Hunter Jones, (May 2018 to April 2020) .
The Legal Fiction
The structure was deliberately opaque. Hunter Jones functioned as an “introducer firm” —marketing high-risk investments to retail investors while technically not providing “regulated advice”. This distinction proved to be a legal fiction. The FOS repeatedly found that Hunter Jones was in fact carrying out regulated activities—specifically, arranging deals in investments.
The “Sophisticated Investor” Loophole
Hunter Jones exploited the “sophisticated investor” self-certification loophole. As a self-certified investor, Mr C was expected to have the necessary knowledge and experience to determine whether or not he should have invested. In reality, as the FOS found, the firm hadn’t checked if Mr C really qualified.
The Marketing Tactics
Hunter Jones used confident language around ‘secured’, ‘asset-backed’, or ‘low-risk’ returns to lure investors. The company’s website promised “fixed return, options for periodic income, a Security Trustee, and a well-defined exit strategy” . None of these promises materialised.
The Scale of the Operation
The company claimed to have raised capital from investors across 60+ countries. By 2023, it had expanded to 2 new jurisdictions and was on track to scale growth by a further 20%.
IX. THE AMERICAN CONNECTION: Robert Hunter Jones and Great Point Capital
While the UK Hunter Jones operation was collapsing, a different Hunter Jones—Robert Hunter Jones—was operating in Lakewood, Colorado, as a broker with Great Point Capital LLC.
The DST Complaints
In December 2025, a FINRA arbitration (Case No. 25-02029) was filed against Robert Hunter Jones. The arbitration alleges that in 2023, Jones advised a customer to purchase a Delaware Statutory Trust (DST) investment as part of a 1031 tax-deferred exchange.
The claimant contends that the recommendation was unsuitable and that Jones failed to conduct adequate due diligence, while also breaching contractual and fiduciary obligations.
Damages sought: $475,000.
A second complaint against Jones—reported by Carlson Law—alleges similar misconduct, with damages sought of $75,000.
The Parallels
The parallels between the UK and US operations are striking:
| UK Operation (Hunter Jones) | US Operation (Robert Hunter Jones) |
|---|---|
| Unregulated introducer | Registered broker |
| Promoted loan notes (MIXG Ltd) | Promoted Delaware Statutory Trusts |
| Misrepresented risk and security | Made unsuitable recommendations |
| FOS found mis-selling | FINRA arbitration pending |
| Investors lost life-changing sums | Investors seek $550,000+ |
X. THE SYSTEMIC FAILURE: How Did This Happen?
The Regulatory Gaps
The Hunter Jones cases expose deep, systemic failures in financial regulation on both sides of the Atlantic.
In the UK, the “introducer” model allowed unregulated firms to market high-risk investments to retail investors without direct FCA oversight. The self-certification loophole allowed ordinary savers to be classified as “sophisticated” investors.
The FCA has since told the Treasury it believes the law should be changed, warning MPs that the current self-certification regime “allows bad actors to pressure consumers into wrongly self-certifying” .
The Employer’s Responsibility
In the UK, EforG—the regulated principal—failed to supervise its appointed representative effectively. The FOS found that EforG was responsible for Hunter Jones’s conduct.
The Product Problem
Mini-bond loan notes and Delaware Statutory Trusts are inherently problematic products. They are complex, illiquid, and high-fee. They generate substantial commissions for advisors and introducers, creating perverse incentives.
The Enforcement Gap
The FCA warning about Hunter Jones was issued in November 2025—years after the mis-selling began. By then, investors had already lost millions. The FOS could order compensation, but with EforG in liquidation, there may be no funds to pay.
XI. THE AFTERMATH: Investigations and Accountability
UK: Liquidation and Compensation
EforG was placed into liquidation in March 2026 after being unable to meet compensation ordered by the FOS. The FCA has received a large number of complaints from investors.
The FSCS Gap
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) does not cover mini-bond investments. This means that investors who lost money through Hunter Jones have little recourse.
US: FINRA Arbitration
The FINRA arbitration against Robert Hunter Jones (Case No. 25-02029) is pending. Multiple law firms—including Rex Securities Law and Carlson Law—are investigating claims against Jones.
The FCA Warning
The FCA warning about Osborne Baldwin Limited, Hunter Jones Group, and HJ Collection remains a critical document for investors seeking to understand the scope of the fraud.
Refundee’s Investigation
Refundee, a claims management company, is currently speaking to investors of HJ Collection and Hunter Jones Group. The company is assessing whether claims can be pursued on a no win, no fee basis.
XII. THE HINDENBURG PAPERS’ ROLE: A Model for Investigative Journalism
The Hindenburg Papers’ investigation into Hunter Jones—on both sides of the Atlantic—represents a model for how independent investigative journalism can expose financial misconduct and protect investors.
The investigation combined:
- Social media analysis: Reviewing Facebook comments and public posts from victims
- Regulatory record analysis: Examining FOS determinations and FINRA records
- Financial forensics: Tracing the flow of investor funds
- Whistleblower engagement: Collecting testimony from former clients and employees
- Cross-border analysis: Connecting the UK, US, and Dubai operations
The result is a comprehensive exposé of a fraud network that has operated with impunity for years.
XIII. CONCLUSION: The Price of Greed
Hunter Jones built a business on the trust of investors. It presented itself as professional, credible, and successful. It promised security, returns, and peace of mind. And then it systematically betrayed that trust.
In the UK, ordinary savers were funnelled into unregulated loan notes that collapsed, leaving them with nothing. In Dubai, off-plan property schemes promised luxury returns but delivered only broken promises. In the US, investors were pushed into unsuitable DST investments that trapped their money in illiquid, fee-heavy products.
Jack Russell’s warning that “Hunter Jones was deliberately structured to appear credible and successful” captures the essence of the fraud. The polished branding, the professional websites, the offices, the staff, the sales scripts—all of it was designed to create an illusion of legitimacy. And it worked. Thousands of investors were drawn in, and thousands lost money.
The Financial Ombudsman Service has found that Hunter Jones mis-sold investments. The FCA has issued a warning. FINRA arbitration is pending against Robert Hunter Jones. But for the investors who lost life-changing sums, none of this is enough.
The question now is: how many more Hunter Joneses are out there, hiding behind polished websites and professional appearances, preying on the trust of unsuspecting investors? The Hindenburg Papers investigation suggests that the answer is far too many.
This investigation is based on Financial Ombudsman Service determinations (DRN-4686776 and DRN-4838876), FCA announcements, FINRA records, social media posts from victims, and reporting by Refundee, TLW Solicitors, and other sources. Hunter Jones Group and Robert Hunter Jones are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.
If you or someone you know has lost money investing with Hunter Jones Group (UK), Robert Hunter Jones (US), or any associated entity, please contact the Hindenburg Papers or a qualified securities attorney to explore your legal rights.
For Part II of this investigation, we will examine the broader pattern of mini-bond and loan note mis-selling in the UK, and the regulatory failures that have allowed this misconduct to continue unchecked.
